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Abstract
In this paper we present a mixed duopoly model of supply function competition under uncertainty with
product differentiation. We find that, regardless the nature of product heterogeneity, the best response of
the private firm always arises as strategic complement. Contrary to this, state-owned firm’s best response
arises either as strategic complement or substitute depending on the product heterogeneity. As a result of
the ex post realization of the demand uncertainty, different equilibria are reached.
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1. Introduction
We investigate the endogenous choice of a supply function as firms’ strategic variable in a mixed duopoly
where a state-owned firm competes against a profit-maximizing firm. In a differentiated product setting
with a numeraire good (Singh and Vives, 1984), uncertainty in the demand side is introduced (Kemplerer
and Meyer, 1986). Firms’ strategies arise either as strategic complements or strategic subsitutes (Bulow
et al., 1985; Akgu¨n, 2004) as a result of product differentiation, yielding the following findings. Overall, it
is found that social welfare is higher as product differentiation approaches perfect complementarity. At the
same time, prices and quantities increase. The contrary holds as products become substitutes. Moreover,
no matter the nature of product differentiation, the state-owned firm always behaves more aggressive than
the private firm producing a higher output and thus, enhancing welfare.
State-owned firms are very common in many markets such as airlines, telecommunications, railways,
electricity, and banking, among other sectors. Concerning the study of mixed oligopolies, classical market
structures like Cournot and Bertrand can be found. In the strand of differentiated duopolies with a state-
owned firm, Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016) have compared quantity and price competition. They also
endogenize the strategic variable (either quantity or price) extending previous findings by Matsumura and
Ogawa (2012). In a more general setting Ghosh and Mitra (2010) also provide interesting results in the
Cournot and Bertrand comparison.
To the best of our knowledge, the assumption of supply function competition (SFC, hereinafter) with
heterogeneous goods in a context of a mixed oligopoly has not been yet studied. We introduce uncertainty
in the demand side, which is a more realistic market environment. Indeed, SFC is a natural way to endog-
enize demand uncertainty because firms may offer different price-quantity pairs as a result of each demand
realization. As Kemplerer and Meyer (1989) have shown, in a symmetric industry the equilibrium in supply
functions is linear and unique. They also state that, under product differentiation with linear demand, the
existence of a unique supply function equilibrium is guaranteed provided that the demand shock has full
support.
Our results differ form Cournot and Bertrand competition because in these settings strategic interaction
takes place only in one dimension, whereas in our framework firms manage a two-dimensional strategy.
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Indeed, Cournot and Bertrand approaches may arise as limit cases from SFC (see, for instance, Martin,
2002, pp. 68–69).
2. The model
We consider an industry with two firms simultaneously producing a heterogeneous product. Firm 0
is a welfare-maximizing public firm (De Fraja and Delbono, 1990) that produces q0, whereas firm 1 is a
profit-maximizing private firm producing a quantity q1. Both firms bear a quadratic cost function given by
Ci(qi) = (c/2)q
2
i , with c ≥ 11. The representative consumer maximizes its surplus U(q0, q1)− (p0q0 + p1q1),
where pi and qi denote firm i’s price and quantity, respectively, for i = 0, 1. The utility function U(q0, q1) =
α(q0 + q1)− (q20 + 2γq0q1 + q21)/2 is assumed to be strictly concave (see Singh and Vives, 1984) with α > 0
and 1 − γ2 > 0. Industry inverse demand functions follow and are given by pi = α − qi − γqj (i, j = 0, 1,
i 6= j). Product differentiation is captured by γ, where γ ∈ Γ := (−1, 0) ∪ (0, 1). If γ is negative (positive)
the products are complements (substitutes). Let us assume that firms are unable to know ex ante the
value of α. Hence, from firms’ point of view, the intercept of the inverse market demand is subject to an
ex ante unobservable realization of α which has strictly positive density f(α) everywhere on the support
(α, α) ⊂ R+, with E(α) = µ and V (α) = σ2. Firms simultaneously compete in supply functions as in
Kemplerer and Meyer (1989) by offering quantity-price pairs according with the linear2 function qi = βipi.
Ex ante market clearing conditions yield prices
pi(βi, βj) =
α(1 + (1− γ)βj)
1 + βi + βj + βiβj(1− γ2) . (1)
A strategy for each firm is to choose the slope βi ≥ 0 which determines prices and quantities. Taking (1), we
denote a firm’s supply function by qi(β0, β1) = βipi(β0, β1). The state-owned firm maximizes the expected
social welfare (consumer surplus and firms’ profits),
max
β0
∫ α
α
(
U(q0(β0, β1), q1(β0, β1))−
1∑
i=0
Ci(qi(β0, β1))
)
f(α)dα,
whereas the private firm maximizes its own expected profits,
max
β1
∫ α
α
pi1(β0, β1)f(α)dα,
where pii(β0, β1) = pi(β0, β1)qi(β0, β1)−Ci(qi(β0, β1)). For the sake of simplicity we assume hereinafter that
c = 1. First order conditions for the state-owned and private firms provide best response functions,
β0(β1) =
1 + 2β1(1− γ) + β21
1 + β1(2− γ2) + β21(1− 2γ + γ2)
, (2a)
β1(β0) =
1 + β0
2 + β0(2− γ2) , (2b)
which yield the optimal strategies reported in the following proposition.
1As stated in De Fraja and Delbono (1990), if each firm’s marginal cost is constant the public firm will impose the rule of
pricing at marginal cost. This is true independently of the relative efficiency of private and public firms. We abstract from this
issue by considering increasing marginal costs.
2It is possible to specify a more general setting where supply functions are defined as qi = υi+βipi. However, when marginal
cost have zero intercept a supply function equilibrium of the form qi = βipi exists (Kemplerer and Meyer, 1989). Moreover,
as Delbono and Lambertini (2015) states, it is possible to define a linear supply function equilibrium by choosing as strategic
variable βi leaving as a parameter υi. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality we take υi = 0 as done in
Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2006).
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Proposition 1. The optimal supply functions for the state-owned and private firms are
β∗0(γ) =
−1 + 2ξ
1− ξ(2− γ2) ,
β∗1(γ) = ξ,
where ξ is the unique real root of the degree 3 polynomial on t, Tγ(t) := (2−γ)2t3 + (2γ3− 5γ2− 2γ+ 6)t2 +
2γt− 2.
Proof. By combining (2a) and (2b) we get the above optimal supply functions β∗0(γ) and β
∗
1(γ). This
solution is well-defined and unique. To show this, we employ analytical tools for cubic equations (see, for
instance, Press et al., 1992, Section 5.6) in order to guarantee that, for each γ ∈ Γ, the polynomial Tγ has
a unique real root ξ. Moreover, one has Tγ(0) = −2 < 0 and lim
t→+∞Tγ(t) = +∞ since (2 − γ)
2 > 0, which
show that β∗1(γ) = ξ > 0 in virtue of the well-known Bolzano’s Theorem. Besides that, one can check that
Tγ(
1
2 ) < 0 < Tγ(
1
2−γ2 ) for all γ ∈ Γ, which implies 12 < ξ < 12−γ2 for all γ ∈ Γ3, and so β∗0(γ) > 0.
We point out that ξ depends on γ although, in the interest of simplicity, we do not make explicit this
dependence and we just write ξ instead of ξ(γ). Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 1, one has that the
state-owned firm always behave more aggressive than the private firm, i.e., β∗0(γ)− β∗1(γ) > 0 for all γ ∈ Γ.
This fact shows that, as the state-owned firm is social welfare-maximizer, it has an additional incentive to
increase output by cutting prices and thus, the state-owned firm’s optimal supply function is always above
the one chosen by the private firm.
Figure 1: Optimal supply functions β∗0 (γ) and β
∗
1 (γ).
3. Results and discussion
Once optimal supply functions β∗i (γ) have been characterized in Proposition 1, we present in the next
proposition the main findings from the best response functions in (2). The core findings of our model follows.
Proposition 2. Consider a mixed duopoly with product differentiation and SFC. Then,
(i) For β0 > 0, the best response function of the private firm operates under strategic complementarity no
matter products are complement or substitutes, i.e., ∂β1(β0)∂β0 > 0 for all γ ∈ Γ.
3Following the same reasoning, one can provide tight lower and upper bounds for ξ. Thus, 1
2−0.5γ < ξ <
1
2−0.6γ whenever
γ ∈ (−1, 0), and 1
2−0.4γ < ξ <
1
2−0.5γ whenever γ ∈ (0, 1).
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(ii) For β1 >
1
2 , the best response function of the state-owned firm operates under strategic substitutabil-
ity (complementarity, respectively) when products are complements (substitutes, respectively), i.e.,
∂β0(β1)
∂β1
< 0 for all γ ∈ (−1, 0) (∂β0(β1)∂β1 > 0 for all γ ∈ (0, 1), respectively).
Proof. Consider the best responses in (2a) and (2b). On the one hand, it follows that
∂β1(β0)
∂β0
=
γ2(
2 + β0(2− γ2)
)2 > 0
for all γ ∈ Γ. On the other hand, one can see that
∂β0(β1)
∂β1
=
γ(2− γ)((3− 2γ)β21 + 2β1 − 1)(
1 + β1(2− γ2) + β21(1− 2γ + γ2)
)2 ,
whose sign solely depends on γ since the denominator is positive, the factor 2− γ is positive for all γ ∈ Γ,
and the factor (3− 2γ)β21 + 2β1 − 1 is positive for all γ ∈ Γ too. To see the last assertion, we consider the
polynomial Sγ(t) := (3 − 2γ)t2 + 2t − 1 and observe that 3 − 2γ > 0 for all γ ∈ Γ. Then, Sγ(t) > 0 if and
only if either t < sγ :=
−1−√4−2γ
3−2γ or t > sγ :=
−1+√4−2γ
3−2γ . It can be checked that sγ < 0 and
1
2 > sγ for all
γ ∈ Γ. Hence, as β1 > 12 > sγ , one gets Sγ(β1) > 0. Thus, the conclusion follows.
Observe that the assumption β1 >
1
2 in Proposition 2 (ii) is not restrictive since, according to (i), one
has β1(0) =
1
2 < β1(β0) <
1
2−γ2 = limβ0→+∞
β1(β0) for all β0 > 0.
Proposition 2 states that in the linear equilibrium of a SFC game, private firm’s best response is upward
sloping, i.e., as the state-owned firm becomes more aggressive, the optimal response of the private firm is to
behave aggressive as well. Notice that the contrary holds in a Cournot game where the optimal response is
to restrict output as the rival firm increases it, yielding to the well known result that quantities are strategic
substitutes. In this sense, in our framework the private firm mimics Bertrand behavior. Nevertheless, the
best response of the state-owned firm is upward sloping only when products are substitutes whereas it is
a decreasing function under product complementarity. The intuition behind is that when products are
substitutes both firms have the incentive to capture market share stealing business to the rival; in this
setting, the best response of the state-owned firm is to reduce prices as long as the private firm behaves
more aggressive. However, when products are complements the private firm exerts higher market power (as
products are used according to a bundle consumers’ willingness to pay is potentially high). Hence, when
the private firm increases the price (cutting output), the best response of the state-owned firm is to behave
more aggressive reducing the price and thus, increasing output.
Now we are in position to discuss more in detail the implications that firms’ optimal supply functions
have in prices and quantities. By combining (1) and Proposition 1, we obtain the following optimal prices
and quantities,
p∗0(γ) =
α(1 + ξ(1− γ))(1− ξ(2− γ2))
γ2ξ(2− ξ) , q
∗
0(γ) =
α(1 + ξ(1− γ))(−1 + 2ξ)
γ2ξ(2− ξ) ,
p∗1(γ) =
α(1− ξ(2− γ))
γξ(2− ξ) , q
∗
1(γ) =
α(1− ξ(2− γ))
γ(2− ξ) ,
which have been represented in Figure 2 below for the case α = 1. Equilibrium prices and quantities above
enjoy the following properties: for any γ ∈ Γ,
(i)
∂p∗i (γ)
∂γ
< 0,
∂q∗i (γ)
∂γ
< 0,
(ii) p∗1(γ)− p∗0(γ) > 0, q∗0(γ)− q∗1(γ) > 0.
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Hence, as complementarity (substitutability) decreases (increases), prices and quantities decrease. In ad-
dition, private firm prices are over the state-owned firm prices, and the contrary holds for quantities (see
Figure 2). These facts can be explained from the above reasoning on the best response functions features.
SFC allows both private and state-owned firms manage at the same time price and quantities. Hence, when
product complementarity takes place, there is weaker competition and the private firm fixes higher prices
(restricting output). Accordingly, the state-owned firm behaves more aggressive by offering lower prices
(and hence increasing output) aimed to partially offset the market power exerted by the private firm and
thus, enhancing social welfare. As long as products become substitutes, competitiveness increases in order to
capture market share and then, the private firm cuts prices. The state-owned firm reacts by cutting prices
as well, although less aggressively than the private firm. As a result, prices are lower than those under
product complementarity, reaching to be equal as γ tends to one. Besides, quantity traded also decreases.
The latter comes from the increasing marginal cost. Indeed, as product substitutability provides lower prices
as a result of a fierce competition, firms decrease output because the marginal income from an extra unit
produced is lower than its marginal cost of production. In other words, when SFC takes place, firms may
adjust price and quantity by choosing the slope of the supply function in order to maximize profits (in the
case of the private firm) and social welfare (in the case of the state-owned firm).
Figure 2: Optimal prices and quantities as a function of γ.
Finally, the resulting expected social welfare and private firm’s expected profit can be characterized as
follows,
E(SW ∗(γ)) = (σ2 + µ2)
(
U(q∗0(γ), q
∗
1(γ))−
1∑
i=0
Ci(q
∗
i (γ))
)
,
E(pi∗1(γ)) = (σ
2 + µ2)
(
p∗1(γ)− q
∗
1 (γ)
2
)
q∗1(γ),
which are unique for each possible realization of the market demand on the support (α, α) ⊂ R+. Accordingly
with the evolution of prices and quantities, as the degree of product differentiation changes, it can be
checked that ∂E(SW
∗(γ))
∂γ < 0 and
∂E(pi∗1 (γ))
∂γ < 0 (see Figure 3, where it is assumed without loss of generality
σ2 + µ2 = 1). The highest level of expected social welfare is attained when products are almost perfect
complements (γ → −1) with the private firm also obtaining higher expected profits. This relationship
is monotonically decreasing as product becomes susbstitutes. However, expected consumer surplus (the
evaluation of the utility function at the equilibrium minus the expenditure) is maximized at γ → 1 (see
Figure 3). This fact comes from the product heterogeneity, as we explain below.
Firstly, under product complementarity market power is large. The state-owned firm tries to preserve
consumer surplus (by increasing output above than produced by the private firm, and also fixing the price
below than the private firm). The intuition behind is that when products are complements, the state-owned
firm is aggressive in order to relax the market power exerted by the private firm. As a consequence, the
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Figure 3: Expected social welfare, consumer surplus and firm’s profits as a function of γ.
state-owned firm puts in the market a large amount of output which obliges to the private firm to increase
output as well, enhancing the expected social welfare. Nevertheless, firms’ expected profits have a higher
share in social welfare.
Secondly, as product substitutability increases, expected consumer surplus benefits from lower prices,
although expected social welfare and private firm’s expected profits decrease. Indeed, the state-owned firm
takes relatively more care about the own profits and private firm profits (by decreasing output at a higher
pace than the private firm). This result arises again as a consequence of the SFC. As we pointed out
above, although competitiveness is enhanced as product becomes substitutes, marginal cost increases with
quantities, so firms adjust production as prices decrease in order to save costs. However, expected consumer
surplus has a higher share in the expected social welfare.
To summarize, it can be said that when SFC takes place, the strategic effect induced by product comple-
mentarity is higher than the welfare effect that the state-owned firm has in the market. As a consequence,
although the expected social welfare is high, the expected consumer surplus is under firms’ profits when
product complementarity is large. Contrary to this, the strategic effect induced by product substitutability
is lower than the welfare effect that the state-owned firm has in the market. As a result, although the
expected social welfare is reduced by the effect of competitiveness (but at a lower rate than it was a pure
duopoly market) the expected consumer surplus is enhanced and, in fact, it is larger than private firms’
profits.
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